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What are Computers  
(if they’re not Thinking Things)? 
 
 Many of us now imagine that in the future humans, either will, or at least 
could, ‘in theory’, construct an electronic digital computer which would really 
be a thinking thing. Alan Turing was perhaps the most notable exponent of this 
view, and a significant proportion of his published work was devoted to arguing 
for it.  
 Even if one accepts this ‘computationalist’ view, the question ‘What are 
computers?’ is still worth asking, since almost no-one thinks of past and existing 
computers, or even of most foreseeable computers, as thinking things. We still 
need an account of what these devices that now surround us are, even if 
computationalists are right to think of them as proto-thinkers, as it were. I think 
that when one sees the answer to this question, the temptation to think that more 
sophisticated computers really would be thinking things evaporates.  
 
Our Technologies  
 The electronic digital computer is the most prominent among a 
proliferation of devices whose operations we regularly and quite naturally 
describe in some terms that can also be used to characterise human actions: 
mousetraps catch mice, washing machines wash clothes, dishwashers wash the 
crockery, thermostats turn the central heating on and off, pocket calculators 
calculate, guided missiles seek the exhaust heat of aircraft in order to destroy 
them, etc, etc.  
 Sometimes the underlying idea is still that these devices are things that we 
use in order to carry out these tasks, activities or functions. In the case of some 
of these devices, though, we have somehow learned to take seriously our talk of 
the device itself carrying out the activity. Usually, no misunderstanding results, 
but the computer falls into this group, since we think and talk of computers as if 
they compute, calculate, search, execute instructions, etc. This is entirely 
contingent, incidentally: when Turing was writing, the term ‘computer’ meant 
person who performs computations, and it could easily have kept that meaning. 
If someone had invented a handy term or acronym for what we now call 
computers (e.g. ‘EDMs’, for ‘electronic digital machines’), ‘computer’ could 
have kept its original meaning, and we would easily and naturally have thought 
of EDMs as ‘the devices that computers use’.  
 There are three aspects to this kind of attribution: the task gets done, it 
gets done correctly, and it’s the device that does it. To take all this at face value 
would be to conclude that these devices can correctly be said to be actually 
performing that function or carrying out that activity which would otherwise 
have to be performed or carried out by a person, using the activity-term in the 
same sense that it has when applied to humans. So we can speak of computers 
not only as ‘searching for’ data, ‘storing’ information, ‘executing’ instructions, 
but also as playing chess, scheduling tasks, controlling the operation of other 
machines, etc.  
 I’d like to suggest, though, that this way of talking when applied to 
computers encourages us to conceive of them in the wrong way, that it involves 
getting their entire relation to us wrong. In the case of computers, it’s quite 
remarkable that hardly anyone stands up for this alternative and, I think, 
commonsense view of them and their activities. A relatively superficial feature 
of the language we use to talk about such devices is allowing  computationalists 
to set the terms of the debate about ‘machine intelligence’.  
 
Replacing-Technologies 
 We human beings aren’t the only tool-using animals, but by any standard 
our use of tools is the most widespread and the most impressive. We use tools in 
situations where we want something done but don’t want to use (only) our 
bodies to do it. Our reasons for not using only our bodies can be various: not 
wanting to get hurt, not being able to fit into or reach a particular space, not 
wanting to get dirty, performing some task (like driving in a screw, or cutting a 
piece of wood) for which no part of the human body will do, as well as 
considerations of speed, cost, efficiency, etc. Alongside using tools (in this core 
sense) that relieve us of tasks that are too dangerous, dirty, or physically 
unmanageable for our bodies, we now also use technologies that relieve us of 
tasks that are boring, complicated, or expensive. This is often where computers 
come in. Of course, we also use computers to help us control machines of other 
kinds – cars, telephones, industrial machines, etc..  
 Computationalists are right to think that there’s something importantly 
different about the computer. The computer is a new kind of technology. But it’s 
a kind that’s nevertheless contiguous with other kinds of technologies, and to 
understand it as a technology is to understand both this contiguity and the way 
in which it goes beyond previous technologies.  
 For each such technology there’s a crucial distinction between the process 
or activity involved and the product that results. What I call ‘replacing-
technologies’ are machines and devices that replace human activities. Not all 
our machines are replacing-technologies: no number of human beings, unaided 
by technology, could produce certain electromagnetic phenomena, or atomic 
power, or a nuclear explosion. We use replacing-technologies to ensure that the 
product or end-state of some activity that could only formerly be done by 
humans is brought about, even though the process or activity itself hasn’t taken 
place. Of course, some process has taken place, but this process isn’t the one that 
we formerly used, unaided, to produce that result.  
 Our pre-computational technology mostly involved tools and implements 
for the performance of tasks that used to require a significant amount of human 
physical effort. Computers, though, mostly relieve us of a different kind of 
activity, the kind of activity that used to require thinking, reasoning, calculating, 
and certain other psychological skills. Because the activities they replace are of 
this kind, intellectual rather than manual, and because these activities are often 
quite distinctive to human beings (they can’t be performed by other creatures), 
computers are a very special, and especially impressive, kind of replacement-
technology, a technology capable of being especially close to our minds (and 
thus perhaps to our hearts, as it were).  
 This distinctiveness is of course down to Alan Turing, who showed not 
only that a certain kind of mathematical function can be encoded in a way that 
makes it ideally suited to be mechanically implemented (in electrical circuitry), 
but also that what we now call ‘Turing machines’ are an absolutely general kind 
of device which can execute any procedure that consists in the manipulation of 
symbols. Since almost all our programmed electronic devices can be thought of 
as (horrendously complicated) Turing machines, our stored-program digital 
computers are general-purpose technologies in a specific way, a way in which 
no previous technology has ever been. Their ever-increasing importance to us 
derives at least partly from this fact.  
 
Intentional Actions and Non-Intentional Operations  
 Because the main philosophical debate has been about machine 
intelligence, computationalists tend to think that if one could show that 
intelligent operations can be ‘broken down into’ unintelligent ones, and then 
show that Turing machines operate entirely on the basis of millions of 
operations of just this unintelligent kind, one would have successfully opened 
the door to the idea of an intelligent machine. There are problems with this 
strategy, but regardless of whether it works, I suggest instead that the key issue 
is really not intelligence but another, more fundamental feature of certain 
psychological concepts, the one that philosophers call intentionality. 
Intentionality is a feature of certain psychological phenomena – crucially, the 
same psychological phenomena that computationalists are centrally concerned 
with, such as thoughts, beliefs, and desires. Its technical definition and history 
aren’t vital here but, the thing to note is that whether or not the high-level 
operations of computers are rightly described in ‘intentional’ terms (as 
computationalists would like), those operations can always be broken down into 
sub-operations that are non-intentional. At the lowest level, (the level of the 
Turing machine), the operations involved are clearly and purely mechanical. 
They are operations such as: scanning a square on the machine-tape, registering 
the contents of that square, erasing the symbol in the square, writing such a 
symbol, etc. The fact that these operations are purely mechanical is a sure sign 
that they’re not genuinely intentional. Neither human actions nor human 
psychological skills, though, can be thus ‘broken down’. Complex actions and 
skills can be thought of as composed of simple ones, of course, but these simple 
ones are still intentional. This is a logical feature of intentionality, not merely a 
contingent one, and it marks a fundamental, categorical divide between the way 
in which computers work and the nature of human beings. However complex 
our computers become, they will only involve ‘more of the same’ (i.e. more 
such mechanical operations), and this can’t yield thought or intelligence.  
 
The Intentional Stance?  
 Isn’t it the case, though, as Daniel Dennett has suggested, that we take the 
intentional stance with respect to computers? That is, that we (at least on 
occasion) think of them in intentional terms, ascribing intentional properties to 
them?  
 It’s true that we do occasionally say of computers that they ‘want’ or are 
‘waiting for’ an instruction, that they’re ‘recalling’ certain information, or even 
(when they’re taking a long time processing) that they’re ‘thinking about’ an 
issue. More significantly, as I’ve already stressed, although adult human beings 
don’t often think of non-computational devices in such psychological terms, we 
do describe computers as if they achieve the tasks they in fact replace.  
 But to conclude from either of these habits that we do or can take the 
‘intentional stance’ towards them would be a wild exaggeration. The range of 
intentional terms that we apply to computers is radically restricted and thus a 
very weak analogue of the full range of intentional terms that can be applied to 
humans. There’s simply no application for most of the associated psychological 
terms we predicate of other humans, such as hoping, fearing, expecting, 
anticipating, regretting, considering, reconsidering, contemplating, pondering, 
reflecting, etc. This is a consequence of what philosophers call the ‘holism’ of 
the intentional: the serious application of an intentional term brings with it the 
actuality, or at least the possibility, of applying other intentional terms to that 
same person. What’s more, even when we consider those few intentional terms 
that we do apply to computers, we should remember that humans are of course 
quite capable of applying them to non-computational devices, and even to 
artefacts which aren’t devices at all (such as dolls). So although computers 
(machines generally) can be described using a very weak image or shadow of 
one range of our psychological vocabulary, it does no harm whatsoever to think 
that our applications of such terms to machines, including computers, are always 
in ‘scare-quotes’, and not to be taken seriously.  
 Nevertheless, to talk of past, present or, I would argue, future computers 
as achieving the tasks they replace, or even occasionally as performing 
intelligent activities, such as thought, does at least have two very good 
rationales. The first is the fact that what their activities replace are indeed 
usually stretches of thought or intellectual activity. Where this clearly isn’t the 
case, as for example in the case of a car’s engine management system, which is 
also computational, there’s no temptation to think of the device in intentional 
terms. So where we humans, unaided, would have to think in order to attain 
some result, a temptation to conceive also of the computer which can be made to 
achieve that result (perhaps faster, more reliably than we can) as a thinking thing 
is quite naturally felt.  
 The second rationale for talking of computers using a very limited range 
of intentional terms is that most of us simply don’t know how computers 
operate. Their operation is recondite, that is, hidden from our inspection, and its 
full mechanical description is simply unwieldy. It would be quite wrong though, 
to suggest, as Dennett sometimes does, that the only way of coming to 
understand ‘what the computer is doing’ is from the ‘intentional stance’. That is, 
we all know that there is a purely mechanical description of their activity, 
although most of us couldn’t say what it is. Nevertheless, taking the ‘intentional 
stance’ towards computers (where this is understood in a very limited way, as a 
matter of predicting and explaining their operations and products in terms of 
goals, searches, decisions, etc.) is quite natural when one knows of no other way 
of explaining their operations, or even when this other way is simply too long-
winded (which is almost always the case with computers, simply due to the 
number of operations they are capable of performing at great speed). This also 
explains why computer science texts usually explain the operation of computers 
in terms of analogies with human rule-following activities (such as games, 
recipes, knitting patterns, etc.).  
 Both these rationales, however, are very clearly pragmatic in nature. They 
can do nothing to support the serious philosophical conclusion that such 
machines are really performing intentional operations. It’s surely ironic that 
serious thinkers who would otherwise scout such considerations have allowed 
them to prevail in this context, since elsewhere such rationales would normally 
be regarded as hopelessly insufficient for a philosophical conclusion.  
Conclusion  
 In sum, computers are the very latest kind of labour-saving technologies. 
The labour they save isn’t that of the ‘workers by hand’, though, but that of the 
‘workers by brain’. However sophisticated, computers aren’t things which 
compute, but things that we use to replace the human activity of computation. 
Perhaps they might thus be described as things that people compute with, or 
things that people use to compute. But even these descriptions might have to be 
taken with a pinch of salt.  
 Among those working in the field of artificial intelligence, it is perhaps 
the designers of ‘expert systems’ who have come closest to realising the 
replacement status of computer technologies, since they’re quite explicitly aware 
that they are (in their terms) trying to ‘mechanise’ the boring bits of expert’s 
jobs. How ironic that the least interesting bit of artificial intelligence (from the 
point of view of philosophy) should have the clearest conception, not merely of 
the goals of the subject, but also of the nature of the devices it produces!  
 Where does all this leave Alan Turing himself? Turing manifestly still 
counts as a great thinker, one whose mathematical work made possible the 
development of devices that are effecting an enormous and unprecedented 
transformation in human work- (and leisure-) activity. He is thus the herald of a 
new machine-age (for better or worse, of course). But if we cease to think of 
him as the herald of thinking or intelligent machines, his achievements will in no 
way be underestimated.  
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